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ABSTRACT 
Although the tax reforms of the 1980s substantially  lowered 
the excess burden caused by high marginal tax rates, there were 
also significant adverse effects on incentives to save and to 
invest in business plant and equipment. 
Effective tax rates on. real capital gains and real net 
interest income remain very high because the tax rules do not 
recognize the difference between real and nominal magnitudes. 
These high effective tax rates discourage personal  saving. The 
paper discusses a number of ways in which the tax law could be 
modified  to encourage more saving and less borrowing. 
Existing  tax rules bias corporate decisions  in favor of debt 
finance relative to equity finance and in favor of investrents in 
intangible assets (like advertising, consumer goodwill, and R and 
D)  relative to investments in plant and equipment. The paper 
discusses the use of a cashflow corporate tax  (with complete 
expensing of investment and no deduction for interest payments) 
as a way of remedying both of these biases in our current tax 
law. 
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The tax reforms of the l980s achieved a remarkable reduction 
of personal  income tax rates.  Cutting the marginal tax rate from 
the 70 percent rate at the start of the decade to 28 percent on 
the  investment income of the highest income taxpayers reduced the 
associated deadweight loss to less than one—sixth of its previous 
level. Even the smaller reduction of the top marginal tax rate on 
personal services income from 50 percent to 28 percent reduced 
the associated deadweight  loss by nearly three-fourths. 
The restructuring  of the personal income tax in the l980s is 
testimony to the power of economic ideas.  Economists  for decades 
have emphasized the adverse effects of high marginal  tax rates 
and have advocated broader tax bases with lower marginal tax 
rates. In the end, this key idea came to have widespread 
bipartisan  support in the Congress and in the Administration. 
While it took strong political leaders to persuade  the public of 
the desirability of tax reform and imaginative staffs in the 
Administration  and in the Congress to invent the technical 
gimmicks that made the final legislation acceptable to a 
Congressional majority, the driving force behind the reform was 
the basic economic insight that high marginal tax rates have 
disproportionately  large burdens. 
*professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the 
National  Bureau of Economic Research. This paper  was prepared for 
presentation at the annual meeting of the American Economic 
Association, December  1988. I.  Adverse Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
As a result of political considerations, some provisions of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 contain serious harmful effects of the 
incentives to save and invest. Although the revenue effects of 
reducting high marginal tax rates were balanced  in part by 
eliminating the opportunities  for tax shelter investments and the 
deductibility  of net nonmortgage interest, that still left some 
high  income taxpayers with substantial tax reductions. Even 
though the total net revenue loss was relatively small and could 
easily have been offset by a small increase in all tax rates or 
other modifications  of tax rules, there was strong political 
pressure to provide middle and lower income taxpayers with even 
larger proportional tax reductions than those received by high 
income taxpayers.  The legislation was therefore expanded to 
include a  massive increase in personal exemptions, an increase 
that cost approximately  $25 billion a year in lost revenue with 
almost no effect on marginal tax rates. To keep the overall tax 
bill revenue neutral, this revenue loss had to be offset by an 
equally large increase in corporate taxes. This corporate tax 
increase was achieved by eliminating the investment tax credit 
and reducing depreciation allowances, changes that substantially 
reduced the incentive to invest in business  plant and equipment. 
Even with  the enlarged personal exemptions, the distribution 
of the tax reductions appeared to favor higher income taxpayers. 
This appearance was an illusion because the Treasury and the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation did not take the increased corporate tax into account  in calculating the 
distributional consequences of the legislation. Doing so would 
have shown that the overall effect of the tax reform was to raise 
the tax burden on higher income taxpayers  (Feldstein,l988). The 
tax bill was nevertheless modified to raise the tax burden of 
higher income taxpayers by eliminating their IRA deductions, 
capping pension contributions,  imposing an extra tax on large 
pension payouts, and, most importantly, by taxing realized 
capital gains at the same tax rates as ordinary  income. 
Because capital gains realizations are very sensitive to tax 
rates  (Feldstein, Slenrod and Yitzhaki, 1980; Lindsey,  1987), 
this last change may not in the end lead to any increased tax 
collections from higher income taxpayers.  It will undoubtedly 
have the adverse effects of reducing the incentive to invest in 
equities, encouraging the corporate use of debt  finance, and 
decreasing the overall efficiency of the capital market. 
Ironically, ignoring the actual increase in the tax burden on 
upper income taxpayers  that resulted from the rise in the 
corporate tax led to an increase in the capital gains tax rate 
that will have serious adverse effects on the economy without 
necessarily raising the tax paid by those high income 
individuals. 
The tax reforms of the 1980s have succeeded in reducing 
marginal  tax rates and eliminating the personal tax shelters. 
The tax reforms of the 1990s are likely to focus on improving the 
taxation of capital income to increase saving, to improve the 
3 allocation of total capital formation and to reduce the current 
incentive for excess use of corporate debt. 
II.  Insufficient Saving 
The United States has long had one of the lowest saving 
rates in the world and a rate that falls far short of equating 
the social rate of return on additional capital and the 
intertemporal discount rate that individuals apply to future 
consumption  (Feldstein, 1977). The low rate of saving means that 
the United States has a lower level of income and possibly a 
substantially  lower rate of income growth than would otherwise be 
possible. 
The already low rate of saving fell precipitously  in the 
1980s.  During the decade of the 19705, the total net private 
saving rate in the United States, including the saving of 
households, businesses, pensions and state—local governments 
averaged  8.9 percent of GNP. By the first half of  1988,  that 
saving rate had fallen to only 5.7 percent of CNP, lower than any 
other major industrial nation. The decline of private saving is a 
particularly serious problem because our chronically high budget 
deficits still absorb private saving equal to more  than 3 percent 
of GP. 
The high effective tax rates on saving are not the only 
reason for the  low rate of private saving in the United States. 
Private saving fell in the l980s because of the rise in personal 
wealth  (resulting from the increae in stock prices and home 
4 values)  ,  the  increased availability of home equity loans and 
other forms of consumer credit, and the reduced number of 
underfunded private pensions.  But taxes are clearly an important 
reason for our chronically low saving rate and one that can be 
reversed by changes in policy. While some skeptics express doubts 
about the potential effects of tax rules on private saving, the 
research of a large number of careful scholars [including Boskin 
(1978),  Summers (1981), and Venti and Wise  (1987)]  confirms that 
personal saving does respond to changes in effective tax rates 
and after—tax rates of return. 
Despite the sharp reductions in statutory tax rates, the 
effective tax rates on the return to saving remain very high 
because existing tax rules fail to distinguish real and nominal 
rates of return. Consider a taxpayer who earns a 9 percent 
nominal return on a bond and expects inflation to average 5 
percent during the life of the bond.  His expected pretax real 
return is thus 4 percent.  If the taxpayer has a 28 percent 
marginal  federal income tax rate and a 5 percent state income tax 
rate, he faces a combined marginal tax rate that  takes one third 
of his nominal  9 percent return. His after tax nominal rate of 
return is therefore only 6 percent.  With a  5 percent expected 
inflation, the real after tax return is only 1 percent. 
Thus taxes reduce the real return to 1 percent from 4 
percent because the tax law does not correctly distinguish 
between real interest income and the payments that just offset 
the inflationary erosion of the debt.  Although the combined 
5 federal and state statutory rate is only 33 percent, the 
effective tax rate on real interest income is 75 percent. 
Although the situation today is substantially better than it was 
a few years ago when inflation and tax rates were both 
substantially  higher, today's tax rules leave little incentive to 
save. 
The situation is no better for individuals who  invest their 
savings in common stock. Someone who bought a diversified 
portfolio of stocks like the Standard and Poor's 500 back in 1978 
has enjoyed one of the great bull markets of the century. An 
investment of $10,000 would bring $28,000 if sold today.  Even 
allowing for the fact that the rise in consumer prices since 1978 
means that it takes $18,250 to buy today what $10,000 would buy 
in 1978, the real gain was $9,750 or 4.4 percent  a year.  Adding 
this to the current 3.6 percent dividend yield implies an S 
percent pretax real return, enough to compensate for risk and 
provide an incentive to save. 
But that 8 percent return ignores the effect of taxes. 
Since the tax law does not distinguish between real and nominal 
capital gains, the investor who sold that portfolio in 1988 would 
have to pay tax on an $18,000 gain.  With a  33 percent combined 
federal-state tax rate, the tax bill would be $6,000 or 62 
percent of the real gain. The net-of—tax real rate of gain would 
be only 1.9 percent. Even when combined with a current net—of—tax 
dividend yield of 2.4 percent, the total return of 4.3 percent is 
hardly enough to compensate for the risks of equity market 
6 fluctuations, let alone to provide an incentive to save.  It is 
not surprising that individuals have been net sellers of 
corporate equities. 
The  failure to distinguish real and nominal interest also 
reduces the net cost of mortgage borrowing and other consumer 
debt. An individual who borrows at 12 percent faces a 7 percent 
real cost of funds before tax but only a 3 percent net—of-tax 
cost of funds. 
The most  obvious remedy for these defects in the tax 
treatment  of capital income is to adjust the measurement of 
capital gains and of interest, including interest on consumer 
borrowing  and mortgage debt, to reflect the difference between 
nominal and real interest rates. Administrative  complexity and 
the inability to adjust for inflation with complete precision do 
not result in as much economic loss as a tax system that grossly 
mismeasures  real taxable income and dramatically reduces the net 
incentive to save.  Moreover,  if fully implemented, these 
adjustments for inflation would actually increase total tax 
revenue. 
The current taxation of capital income would of course still 
reduce the incentive to save even if real capital income and 
expenses were measured perfectly. A  consumption tax or consumed— 
income tax that excluded all savings from the tax base would 
eliminate this distortion. Although such a consumed—income  tax 
might be chosen over an ordinary income tax in the initial design 
of a new national tax system, there are formidable problems of 
7 transition from the existing system to a consumption based tax. 
There are also substantial problems in a consumed—income  tax 
associated with the purchase of homes and major consumer 
durables. 
These difficulties may not be worth confronting since a 
piecemeal approach can achieve much of the reduction in the tax 
distortion against saving. Because of the Individual Retirement 
Accounts  and private pension rules, most American taxpayers 
already face the equivalent of consumed-income tax rules for 
retirement saving. Moreover, most taxpayers do not itemize their 
deductions and therefore cannot deduct any interest expenses. 
Further piecemeal progress toward a consumed—income tax 
framework and therefore a greater incentive to save could include 
six changes from current tax law: (1) increasing the income 
limits for IRA eligibility and indexing those limits to keep up 
with  income growth in the future;  (2)  providing IRA-type tax 
treatment for long—term deposits that are withdrawn before 
retirement age, thus appealing to younger households (3) 
introducing IRA—type accounts for other special purposes  like 
home purchase  or educational finance; (4) phasing out the 
remaining interest deductions for consumer interest financed by 
home equity loans;  (5) indexing the cost basis in calculating 
taxable capital gains; and (6) excluding a fraction of taxable 
interest income and expenses based on the ratio of the inflation 
rate to the interest rate on government bonds. III.  Misallocated Investment and Excessive Debt 
The current system of taxing corporate income leads to a 
misallocation  of total investment and potentially destabilizing 
levels of corporate debt.  Although the 1986 elimination of the 
investment tax credit and decrease in depreciation allowances 
were advocated as ways of "levelling the playing field" among 
different types of business investments, the net effect of these 
changes was to increase the tax bias against investments in 
business plant and equipment in favor of investments in owner 
occupied housing and in corporate intangible assets like 
advertising, customer cjLdwill, manpower training, and research 
and development that can be expensed at the time of investment. 
This tax distortion leads to a  misallocation of capital that 
reduces the level of real income and the rate of economic growth. 
Tax rules distort the composition of corporate  finance a 
well as the composition of business  investment.  For many years 
economists were puzzled by the failure of corporations to respond 
to the strong tax incentives to use debt and to substitute share 
repurchases for dividend payments. Debt is a lower cost source of 
finance because interest payments are deductible in calculating 
taxable profits. Share repurchases involve a lower tax burden on 
shareholders because the cost of the stock is subtracted in 
calculating the taxable gain and, until recently, that gain was 
taxed at lower rates than dividend income. In recent years, 
practice  has caught up with theory, helped in part by the new financial technology of junk bonds and the favorable initial 
experience of large leveraged buyout funds. 
Now there is increasing concern that the tax distortion in 
favor of debt is creating an excessive volume of LBOs and an 
undesirably high level of debt. The Federal Reserve and others 
have indicated concern that high debt levels that may be 
privately  optimal could cause substantial economy—wide problems 
if high  interest rates or a severe recession caused widespread 
defaults.  While it is difficult to assess these risks, there is 
no doubt that the current tax rules provide a strong bias in 
favor of debt finance. 
The concern about excessive debt has recently led to 
proposals to limit the deduction of interest by highly leveraged 
corporations or on debt assumed in LBO transactions.  There are 
clear practical difficulties in distinguishing LBO5 from the 
ordinary acquisitions that are a constant part of corporate 
growth. Attempts to restrict interest deductibility is likely to 
transfer  borrowing to companies that currently have low debt— 
equity ratios or to foreign companies. In the end, such 
restrictions are unlikely to limit the substitution of share 
repurchases for dividends and will do little or nothing to reduce 
overall debt finance. 
One way to reduce the existing tax bias in favor of debt and 
the incentive for LBO share repurchases would be to replace the 
current corporate income tax with a cash—flow corporate income 
tax. The cash—flow corporate tax would also eliminate the tax 
10 bias that currently exists against investment in plant and 
equipment  relative to outlays on advertising and other forms of 
"intangible capital"  and to investments in owner—occupied 
housing. 
The cash—flow  corporate income tax can be implemented by two 
changes from the current corporate income tax: eliminating the 
deductibility  of interest expenses (thus treating them like 
dividends) and permitting an immediate write-off of all 
investments in plant and equipment (thus treating such 
investments like all other business costs). As King  (1988)  notes, 
eliminating the deductibility of interest expenses is equivalent 
to continuing  the interest deduction but including net borrowing 
as a taxable receipt. This establishes that the cash-flow 
corporate  income tax is equivalent to taxing the difference 
between all cash receipts  (other  than from the sale of new 
equity) and all cash payments  (other  than the payment of 
dividends). 
Because outlays on plant and equipment are expensed under a 
cash flow corporate tax in the same way as outlays for 
advertising, training and other current costs, the bias against 
investments in fixed capital is eliminated. The cash-flow 
corporate  income tax simultaneously solves the problems of 
misallocated corporate investment and excess corporate debt. The 
revenue loss from periniting  all investment to be expenses would 
be balanced  by eliminating the deductibility of interest; any 
remaining revenue difference could be made up by a small change 
11 inthe corporate tax rate. 
:IV  Conclusion 
The new administration has the opportunity to focus on tax 
reform aimed at strengthening capital formation.  If they are 
siccessful, the United States will have a higher  level of saving, 
more investment in plant and equipment, and less reliance  on 
corporate debt. 
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